There are currently no recommended epidemic-control measures for Mycoplasma pneumoniae pneumonia outbreaks in closed communities. Previous studies have suggested the usefulness of chemoprophylaxis administered to close contacts of case-patients. To evaluate the effectiveness of various epidemiccontrol measures during an institutional outbreak, an observational study was undertaken during a very large outbreak of M. pneumoniae pneumonia at a facility for developmentally disabled residents (n Å 142 cases). Control measures evaluated included no control, standard epidemic-control measures, and targeted azithromycin prophylaxis (500 mg on day 1, 250 mg/day on days 2-5) plus standard epidemiccontrol measures. The combined use of azithromycin prophylaxis and standard epidemic-control measures was associated with a significant reduction in the secondary attack rate. This study suggests that the addition of antibiotic prophylaxis to standard epidemic-control measures can be useful during institutional outbreaks of M. pneumoniae pneumonia.
Mycoplasma pneumoniae is an important cause of upper and
M. pneumoniae outbreak, hospital staff receiving tetracycline had a reduced rate of illness [20] . Here we describe the largest lower respiratory tract infections and is the most common cause of pneumonia during the summer months. It has been implireported institutional outbreak of M. pneumoniae pneumonia to our knowledge and our evaluation of the effectiveness of cated in several institutional outbreaks of pneumonia, some of which lasted as long as 6 months [1 -7] . Secondary attack rates various epidemic-control measures in reducing the secondary attack rate of pneumonia. have ranged from 10% to 50% in closed populations of mentally disabled patients, institutionalized boys, military recruits, children at summer camp, and families [1, 2, 8 -13] . Although Methods M. pneumoniae infection is rarely fatal, long-term sequelae can include neurologic, dermatologic, and hematologic complicaBackground. Facility A is a very large long-term-care hospital tions [14] .
for the developmentally and mentally disabled. About 800 resiTransmission occurs via respiratory droplets, requiring close dents are grouped by diagnosis and functional status and live in contact with an infected person. The incubation period is usu-33 closed residential units. Unit residents spend most of their ally 14 -21 days [15] . Recommendations for infection control time together, dining and participating in rehabilitation activities, in patients hospitalized with Mycoplasma infection include the separate from residents of other units, but on occasion unit residents mix with residents from other units at the check-dispensing use of both standard and droplet precautions [16] . Currently, office or at the hospital canteen.
however, there are no specific recommendations for control of (i.e., placing patients into private rooms and wearing masks when During a community outbreak of M. pneumoniae pneumonia, appropriate) [16] . Epidemic-control measures for units in which household contacts receiving oxytetracycline had a reduced these patients resided included cohorting staff and residents and rate of clinical disease [19] , and during a hospital-associated promoting hand washing. On 15 August, because of the continuing number of cases and the lack of identification of an etiologic agent, the facility requested assistance from the California Department of Health Services. JID 1998; 177 (January) azithromycin (500 mg on day 1 and 250 mg on days 2-5) was epidemic-control measure in place at the time the first case-patient was diagnosed: group 1, no standard epidemic-control measures administered to all unit residents and offered to staff working on a particular unit the day a newly involved unit identified its first (13 June-3 August 1995); group 2, standard epidemic-control measures (4-24 August 1995); and group 3, standard epidemiccase. Azithromycin (a macrolide) was chosen because it has a long half-life and can be administered once a day; it has few adverse control measures plus azithromycin prophylaxis (25 August-6 October 1995). A primary case was defined as the first diagnosed effects or drug interactions and was provided by the manufacturer at no cost to the facility.
case among residents in a unit or a case occurring in another resident in the same unit within the first 2 weeks after the initial Initial investigation and case-finding. To confirm the presence of an outbreak, admission records to the facility's acute-care hospicase was diagnosed, given an incubation period for this disease of §14 days. A secondary case was defined as a case occurring 2-tal were reviewed. The number of cases of pneumonia in June and July 1995 were compared with the average number of cases of 9 weeks after the initial case was diagnosed in the unit.
To evaluate the role of previous infection with M. pneumoniae pneumonia in June and July during the previous 5 years. Because this was a summertime epidemic of pneumonia, M. pneumoniae in determining effectiveness of epidemic-control measures and to identify subclinical infection, we obtained baseline sera for M. was suspected as the etiologic agent. Sera from convalescent patients were sent to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention pneumoniae IgG antibody from residents of group 3 units within 1 week after the identification of the initial unit case and follow-(CDC; Atlanta), and tested by using an antibody test system for M. pneumoniae IgG and IgM antibody (Remel, Lenexa, KS) [21] .
up sera at least 3 weeks later. Residents were defined as previously infected if they had a baseline complement fixation IgG titer of After the outbreak was confirmed as being caused by M. pneumoniae, a facility-wide surveillance system for new cases was §1:32. Residents were defined as recently infected if there was a 4-fold rise or fall in titer or a follow-up titer of §1:32 [22] . implemented by taking daily oral or rectal temperatures of all residents and referring either febrile residents (temperature Secondary attack rates for the residents in each housing unit were calculated by dividing the number of secondary cases by the §37.8ЊC) or residents with cough for further evaluation and chest radiography. Ill staff members were requested to report to the number of susceptible residents within the housing unit. The number of susceptible residents was equal to the number of residents employee health clinic. A case of pneumonia in a resident or staff member was defined as both the presence of an infiltrate on chest in the housing unit minus the number of primary cases minus the number of previously infected residents. This secondary attack rate radiograph and a fever or cough, with onset of illness during 13 June to 6 October 1995.
was adjusted by dividing by the number of primary cases in each unit to account for ''transmission pressure'' (i.e., the increased During the first 9 weeks of the outbreak, convalescent sera from residents who had pneumonia were sent to a private laboratory for likelihood of secondary transmission in housing units with more than one primary case). Crude and adjusted housing unit secondary M. pneumoniae IgG testing by indirect fluorescent antibody (Zeus Scientific, Raritan, NJ). In addition, sera were obtained and tested attack rates were compared by use of Kruskal-Wallis analysis of variance for nonparametric data. The x 2 test was used to compare from residents with pneumonia between 1 January and 12 June 1995. Laboratory confirmation of M. pneumoniae pneumonia was proportions. All P values were two-tailed, and P £ .05 was significant. defined as a 4-fold rise or fall in titer or a single convalescent titer §1:64. Paired sera from a convenience sample of cases were also tested by use of a complement fixation assay for antibody to M. pneumoniae (Viral and Rickettsial Disease Laboratory, California
Results
Department of Health Services, Berkeley) and were defined as positive if there was a 4-fold rise or fall in titer or a single titer Initial investigation and case-finding. During June and July of §1:32 [22] . M. pneumoniae was also isolated from some pa-1995, 23 cases of pneumonia were identified in facility A residents, tients by culture of the throat or nasopharyngeal swabs in SP4 versus on average only 5 cases in June and July during the previous medium [23] . Presence of M. pneumoniae DNA was detected by housing units. The number of secondary and subsequent cases † P Å .008, Wilcoxon rank sum test, comparing group 1 adjusted unit second-(n Å 62) was almost twice the number of primary cases (n Å ary attack rate with group 3 adjusted unit secondary attack rate. Group 2 adjusted unit secondary attack rate was not significantly different from those 33). There were 14 primary and 44 secondary cases in group of group 1 or group 3 (P ú .05).
1 units, 11 primary and 9 secondary cases in group 2 units, and 8 primary and 2 secondary cases in group 3 units ( figure  2 ). Throughout the outbreak, the number of primary cases for The baseline characteristics of the units in the 3 epidemiceach unit ranged from 1 to 5 (median, 1) and was relatively control groups were similar (table 1) . There were no significant constant over the course of the epidemic (data not shown).
differences among the epidemic-control groups by unit census, The overall baseline anti-M. pneumoniae IgG prevalence sex, age, or IQ. Epidemic-control group 1 had a lower mean among residents who did not become ill (i.e., the non-case resilevel of global functioning (P Å .02), but global functioning dents) was 16 (3.7%) of 427. In the 11 units in which most was not significantly correlated with the unit secondary attack residents were tested, the baseline IgG prevalence by unit ranged rate within any of the 3 epidemic-control groups or among the from 0 to 10% (median, 0). Only 4 (3.1%) of 129 residents had individual units (r Å 0.42, P Å .09). Additionally, IQ was not recent infection among the group 3 unit residents tested. correlated with the unit secondary attack rate (r Å 0.03, P Å .92). Within each group, there was no correlation between unit [1 -13, 25] . A total of 142 cases of pneumonia in residents and ity in our analysis by removing these seropositive residents from the unit susceptible population. Additionally, to account staff at facility A were identified by chest radiographs during the 16-week outbreak period from 13 June to 6 October 1995.
for differences in the force of transmission by exposure of contacts to multiple primary cases, we adjusted the secondary The attack rate (11.9%) for pneumonia among residents was higher than previously reported attack rates in similar populaattack rates and were still able to demonstrate a reduction in the secondary attack rate between group 1 and group 3 units. tions [1, 2] (Cochi SL, personal communication). This might be explained by the low prevalence of detectable antibody in Our study is consistent with two previous studies [19, 20] demonstrating the efficacy of chemoprophylaxis in reducing the this relatively isolated population, suggesting a lack of recent exposure, which resulted in increased susceptibility to infecsecondary transmission of M. pneumoniae pneumonia. Adding azithromycin chemoprophylaxis to standard epidemic-control tion, especially pneumonia. A second factor that might have contributed to the high proportion of pneumonia in this outmeasures in this large institutional outbreak of M. pneumoniae further reduced unit secondary attack rates. Until it is possible break was the low functional status of the residents. Developmentally disabled patients have experienced increased attack to conduct a randomized controlled trial, the addition of targeted chemoprophylaxis to standard epidemic-control mearates of Mycoplasma pneumonia during outbreaks [1] (Cochi SL, personal communication), and, in our study, cases were sures should be considered in the control of institutional outbreaks of M. pneumoniae. significantly more likely to occur in units housing developmentally disabled patients than in units housing mentally disabled patients.
